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Abstract 
 
The proliferation issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea is becoming a more serious 
problem to the international community. North Korea has been manufacturing and developing 
nuclear weapons technology, which receives many critics by the international community expressing 
that North Korea is being non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) 1968. The criticism emerged following the North Korea withdrawal from the NPT 
1968. Its withdrawal reasoning seems very hard to be justified after series of non-compliance 
behavior conducted by North Korea and the legitimacy of its withdrawal is being debated. By using 
normative legal research, the research aims to determine the status of North Korea upon its 
withdrawal from the NPT 1968 based on the withdrawal procedure that is required in the Article X 
of the NPT 1968. The result shows that North Korea is still a member and it is bound by the 
obligations contained in the Treaty and to make progress on a complete nuclear disarmament 
regime. 
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Abstrak 
 
Program pengembangan senjata nuklir di Korea Utara terus menjadi masalah yang serius 
dan menjadi perdebatan komunitas internasional. Korea Utara dianggap masih memproduksi dan 
mengembangkan teknologi senjata nuklir tanpa memedulikan kritik dari komunitas internasional. 
Perbuatan Korea Utara semakin dikecam karena program tersebut menunjukkan ketidakpatuhan 
terhadap Perjanjian Non-Proliferasi Nuklir (NPT) 1968, yang telah ditandatangani. Tahun 2003, 
Korea Utara secara sepihak membuat pernyataan penarikan diri dari Perjanjian tersebut. Namun 
demikian, berdasarkan Pasal X NPT, dunia internasional menyebut bahwa alasan keluarnya Korea 
Utara dalam keikutsertaan sebagai negara anggota NPT sangat sulit untuk dibenarkan dan menjadi 
perdebatan serius dalam hal legalitas. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif dan 
bertujuan untuk mengetahui legalitas keluarnya Korea Utara dari Perjanjian Non-Proliferasi Nuklir 
berdasarkan prosedur pengunduran diri yang diatur di dalam Pasal X NPT. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukkan bahwa Korea Utara tidak bisa secara sepihak menarik diri dari NPT dan masih 
menjadi anggota dari Perjanjian tersebut. Korea Utara juga masih terikat terhadap kewajiban-
kewajiban sebagaimana tercantum dari Perjanjian, terutama melakukan program pelucutan senjata 
nuklir yang diwajibkan untuk semua negara anggota di dunia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A summit between the leaders of the 
United States and North Korea, Donald 
Trump and Kim Jong-Un, was held 
recently in February in Hanoi, Viet Nam. 
The summit was the second United 
States-North Korea summit after the first 
summit that was held back in June 2018 
in Singapore. The leaders are in for talks 
on nuclear disarmament. 
 
Several talks have been done by the 
United States and the international 
community to negotiate with North 
Korea’s regarding its nuclear and missile 
development and the export of nuclear 
missile technology. Despite these efforts, 
numerous reports saying that Kim’s 
administration continues to advance its 
nuclear and ballistic missile program with 
the ongoing rockets, warheads, and fissile 
production. These reports put North 
Korea as a nuclear threat to the global 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
 
All diplomatic efforts done by the 
United States and the international 
community was for denuclearization in 
North Korea when North Korea intended 
to withdraw from the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty 1968 (NPT). The 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was allowing North Korea to 
draw out its obligation to be inspected 
thoroughly by IAEA within 18 months 
after signing and ratifying the NPT 
(Sokolski, 2010: 420). IAEA role in 
carrying out an inspection did not start 
until 1992, and yet during that time, North 
Korea had illicitly separated plutonium. 
When IAEA requested an inspection of 
 
 
 
two nuclear waste sites, North Korea 
refused and submitted their withdrawal 
from the NPT (Huntley, 2006: 724). 
 
The Tensions between North Korea 
with the United States and advocates of 
NPT until mid-1994 that eased with the 
Agreed Framework concluded by the U.S 
and North Korea, which froze North 
Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear power 
program. In 2002, reports said that North 
Korea was doing a second, uranium-based 
nuclear program which triggered the 
Agreed Framework crumbling and 
culminating North Korea withdrew from 
the NPT. 
 
International community questioned 
the legality of this action and the 
justification of North Korea reason to 
withdraw from the NPT as it is considered 
as a step that was not legitimate by the 
world community (Bunn & Timerbaev, 
2005: 23). Even though North Korea 
withdrawal was within the legal 
stipulation under article X of NPT, its 
withdrawal from the NPT do not change 
the fact that North Korea had committed a 
breach toward its obligations under the 
NPT by operating its uranium-enrichment 
program when the NPT was in force and 
its withdrawal far from “good faith” 
principle of international criteria. 
 
Upon its withdrawal from the NPT, 
North Korea stated that it does not have 
any intention on making nuclear weapons 
and their activities will be confined to 
energy power production and other 
peaceful purposes. However, in 2005, 
North Korea officially stated that it has 
nuclear weapons and have conducted 
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nuclear test clarifying their action as part 
of regular military train for self-defense. 
It is a clear cut that North Korea 
withdrawal from NPT was to get away 
from their obligation. 
 
These series of reasoning that it may 
be concluded that the arguments given out 
by North Korea in justifying its 
withdrawal from NPT are difficult to be 
conciliating with the application of the 
extraordinary events clause contained in 
Article X. The academic debate on the 
legitimacy of North Korea withdrawal 
from NPT whether its withdrawal is 
legitimate under international law. Based 
on the background above, the author 
considers analyzing the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in North Korea from an 
international law perspective. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The types of this research are under 
normative research method especially 
related to the issue of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapon under International Law. 
Normative Legal Research is a research in 
the form of prevailing law inventories by 
seeking principles or the basic philosophy 
of the legislation, or a research for the 
legal discovery purpose of any particular 
case (Soekanto & Mamudji, 2007: 12). 
 
Moreover, In connection with the 
normative legal research, the author uses 
a statutory approach and case approach. 
The statutory approach is conducted by 
highlighting some regulations that related 
to the issues while case approach is 
conducted by reviewing the case that 
related to the issues. Statutory approach 
 
 
means that the author highlights some 
legislation or regulation as the basic for 
conducting the research that related to the 
issues while case approach is conducted 
by reviewing the case that related to the 
issue (Marzuki, 2008: 86). 
 
The author collected the data from 
library, focusing on a reading and analysis 
of the primary and secondary materials 
(such as legal dictionaries, textbooks, 
journal articles, case digests and legal 
encyclopedias). 
 
This research uses secondary data that 
consist of primary legal secondary legal 
material and tertiary legal materials. 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons 1968 is used as a 
primary legal material while the 
secondary legal material used scientific 
journals, books, papers or any document 
related to the issue. 
 
The method of collecting data in this 
research will be done through library 
research by literature learning. This 
method collects the data from read, write, 
analyze, and gather information related to 
the topic of this thesis. After having 
information from the documents such as 
 
international and national legal 
instrument, book, journal, and others 
related to the main problem as the main of 
this research, author ultimately tries to 
create conclusion. 
 
The data were analyzed 
 
systematically through juridical 
qualitative approach. Systematically 
through evaluative, where the data was 
taken relating to the issues to be 
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researched. Juridical qualitative means 
that it would be connected with the 
principle of law, convention, and other 
regulation. So that can be systematic, 
 
qualitative and comprehensive, 
illustrating the facts that are valid and 
related to prevailing law. 
 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. History of North Korea and the 
 
Nuclear Weapons Program 
 
North Korea and its nuclear weapons 
program can be traced back from early of 
the 1950s. A nuclear research institution 
was established in 1952 by the North 
Korea government called as the Atomic 
Energy Research Institute but the research 
just began after North Korea established 
an agreement with the USSR (Moltz & 
Mansourov, 2000: 17). North Korea 
signed an agreement in 1956 on nuclear 
research with USSR and not long after 
that, scientists from North Korea along 
with scientists from People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) arrived in Dubna Joint 
Institute for Nuclear Research that located 
in central Russia to be trained and 
introduced to a nuclear power program 
(Clemens, 2010: 129). 
 
In September 1959, North Korea and 
the Soviet Union signed an agreement on 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the 
agreement, it provided a provision that 
stated the Soviets to assist North Korea in 
establishing a nuclear research center that 
will be located on the bank of Kuryong 
River approximately eight kilometers 
from the center of Yongbyon town. The 
 
Soviets provided large technical 
 
 
 
assistance such as the installation of a 
Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor 
and the Soviets engineer took part in the 
construction of the reactor which became 
operational in 1965. Even though in the 
early stage on the development of the 
North Korea nuclear program was 
assisted and influenced by the Soviet 
Union and China, it continues to be 
developed without any significance 
assistance from foreign countries. Then-
North Korean leader Kim Il Sung 
possessed ultimate control of nuclear 
program and decision making related to 
weapons development. 
 
Following China’s nuclear test in 
October 1964, Kim Il Sung asked Chinese 
leader, Mao Tse-tung, to share its nuclear 
weapons technology and help North 
Korea in developing nuclear weapons but 
the Koreans were sent back empty-handed 
(Bermudez, Jr., 1991: 409). The 
relationship between North Korea and 
China became estranged. A year after that, 
however, the Soviet Union sold a small 
two- to four- megawatt research reactor to 
North Korea and later built in the 
Yongbyon neighborhood which began to 
operate in 1967. 
 
North Korea has received assistance 
and aid from foreign countries and they 
started to demand more. North Korea 
began to request for a delivery of a 
nuclear power plant to the Soviets but was 
rejected. The reason behind the Soviets 
rejection was explained in the note report 
of the Embassy of Hungary in North 
Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. 
The Soviet rejected the North Korean 
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leader request as the nuclear reactor that 
had been provided and established in 
Korea with Soviet assistance was 
operated since approximately one and a 
half years ago but there were hardly any 
data about its operation received by the 
Soviet comrades. 
 
There was conflict across the globe 
that happened in 1968. One of the events 
that occurred was an attacked done by 
North Korea against the Republic of 
Korea president’s Blue House in Seoul 
and protested US aggression by seized an 
unarmed US spy ship, the Pueblo. The 
Soviets instructed North Korea to return 
the US crew and the latter did not comply 
with the instruction. Kim Il Sung called 
out on the Soviet Union to honor their 
partnership but was refused by Leonid 
Brezhnev, then-Soviet Union leader, and 
call for them to Moscow. This creates 
tensions between North Korea and Soviet 
leaders. 
 
The United States and USSR as the 
co-author who drafted the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) submitted to all of the UN 
members for signature in 1968 (Quester, 
1972: 1) and that increase the tensions 
between North Korea and the Soviets. 
The USSR turns out stood ready to 
provide nuclear power assistance only to 
clients who were both loyal and advanced 
enough to deal with a nuclear technology 
such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the 
GDR, and Hungary. Romania and North 
Korea considered to be defiant so they 
were excluded and so was Viet Nam; they 
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were obedient but not ready for advanced 
technology. 
 
Romania made a visit to Pyongyang 
in February 1968 which both countries 
agreed that “small countries would also be 
able to use atomic energy on peaceful 
uses and that should be ensured by the big 
countries possessed the nuclear capacity.” 
(Report, 1968). Many objections were 
made towards the NPT in 1968 but 
Romania signed the treaty eventually and 
submitted to the safeguards. However, 
North Korea refused to sign the NPT and 
called off its safeguard agreement with 
IAEA. 
 
By the early 1970s, North Korea 
engineer used their own technology to 
expand the IRT-2000 research reactor and 
they also acquired the plutonium 
reprocessing technology from the Soviets. 
July 1977, North Korea signed a facility-
specific safeguard agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
together with the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets was included in the agreement as 
they were the one who supplied not only 
the IRT-2000 research reactor but also the 
reactor fuel. 
 
In the early 1980s, there was a 
significant expansion done by the North 
Korea engineers where a uranium milling 
facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex, 
and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor was built. 
They started to do the experiment test on 
the high explosive for the nuclear bomb 
triggering mechanism. Not only that, 
North Korea had begun building the 
50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon 
Nuclear Research Center and began to do 
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some expansion to the uranium 
enrichment facilities. 
 
The exploration by North Korea did 
not stop there. They also did some 
exploration on the light water reactor 
technology in the early to mid-1980s. 
This period also consists of the expansion 
of the reactor program. The reactor 
program was designed and construed 
indigenously by North Korea, which was 
designed based on the prototype 25MW 
 
carbon dioxide-cooled, graphite-
moderated reactor and became operational 
in 1986 (Braun, 2016: 4) 
 
On 12 December 1985, North Korea 
joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon 
State (NNWS) (Ahlström, 2004: 770). 
Accordingly, North Korea is under the 
regulation of the NPT and have to comply 
all the rights and obligations as an 
NNWS. NNWS must pursue in good faith 
the three pillars of the NPT, which are 
non-proliferation, the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, and disarmament. 
 
In the early 1990s, Then-President of 
United States, George H. W. Bush, 
announced that the United States would 
withdraw their nuclear weapons from 
South Korea in September 1991 and on 
18 December 1991, South Korea 
President, Roh Taw Woo, declared that 
South Korea was free from nuclear 
weapons (Kristensen & Norris, 2017: 
352). Following that event, the Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula between North 
Korea and South Korea was signed. 
Under the Joint Declaration, both North 
Korea and South Korea agree: 
 
 
 
a. Not to test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy; 
 
b. Not to use nuclear weapons; 
 
c. To use nuclear energy only for 
peaceful purposes; 
 
d. Not to possess facilities for nuclear 
 
reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment(“Joint Declaration of 
 
South and North Korea on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula | Treaties & Regimes | 
 
NTI,”). 
 
This agreement bound the two 
countries to give up their possession of 
nuclear and uranium enrichment facilities 
and the joint declaration also provided a 
bilateral inspection regime, but an 
agreement on its implementation was 
never successful. 
 
B.  North Korea First Withdrawal 
 
from the NPT 
 
In 30 January 1992, North Korea 
agreed to a full safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA based on Article III of the NPT 
and agreed to delay the operation the 
1977 agreement, and North Korea 
government ratified the agreement on 9 
April 1992. The full safeguard agreement 
entered into force on 10 April 1992. 
Based on the term contain in this 
agreement, it required North Korea to 
submit an initial declaration of its nuclear 
materials and facilities and also to give 
IAEA inspectors permission on access to 
verify the validity of the declaration 
(Fischer, 1997: 289). 
 
Six rounds of inspections were 
conducted which began in May 1992 and 
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concluded in February 1993. The DPRK 
submitted the initial report on 4 May 1992 
to the IAEA under the agreement. Under 
IAEA safeguards in 1977, they are only 
aware on the existence of research reactor 
supplied by the Soviets. North Korea in 
the Initial Report listed: 
 
a. 5 MW(e) graphite in the type of 
Magnox; 
 
b. Plant fuel fabrication; 
 
c. radiochemical laboratory; 
 
d. Two larger Magnox type reactors of 
50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) under 
construction. 
 
North Korea itself had indigenously 
built the three Magnox reactors. The 
reactors were built based on similar 
plutonium-based reactors used by Britain 
in 1950s to produce warhead and to 
generate it first nuclear electricity. The 50 
MW(e) reactor was scheduled to be 
finished by North Korea in 1995. 40-50 
kilograms of plutonium would have been 
able to be produced by the reactor in a 
year which enough for producing five to 
ten nuclear warheads. 
 
In the Initial Report, North Korea 
showed a small amount of plutonium (less 
than 100 grams) that they stated that it 
was coming from the extraction of 
damaged fuel rods discharged from the 5 
MW(e) reactor. North Korea persistently 
maintained that they only possess a small 
amount of plutonium that had separated 
and they had only conducted a one-time 
reprocessing operation in 1990. However, 
IAEA analysis result showed that there 
had been more than one-time reprocessing 
activity (Fischer, 1997: 289). Inconsistent 
 
 
with the Initial Report, indicating the 
existence of undeclared plutonium and the 
findings of IAEA (Albright, 2015). 
Whether the undeclared plutonium 
amount to grams or kilograms can only be 
made sure after further investigation and 
more exploration to the reactor or not. The 
waste analysis given by the DPRK to the 
IAEA shows the inconsistencies between 
that and plutonium presented by the 
DPRK. 
 
Meanwhile, satellite images were 
provided by the United States satellite to 
the IAEA and showed two constructions 
had not been listed in the initial report 
submitted by North Korea. It is clear that 
North Korea had tried to disguise the two 
constructions using that planting trees and 
other camouflage as it showed in the 
satellite images. Then, the IAEA 
requested access to additional information 
and to two sites in order to verify the 
validity of the initial report, whether it is 
complete or not. However, IAEA request 
to access the two sites were refused by 
North Korea. The ground of the refusal 
was that the two sites were military 
installations. 
 
After rejection to the IAEA get 
access, in April 1993 the IAEA Board of 
Governors concluded that the DPRK was 
being non-compliance with the IAEA-
DPRK safeguards agreement and referred 
to this non-compliance to the UN Security 
Council. In May 1993 the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 825 by a vote 
of 13 in favor, with China and Pakistan 
abstaining, calling upon the DPRK to 
comply with its safeguard's agreement, 
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two but it was not successful. The special 
inspection did not take place (Vyas, Chen, 
Roy, & East-West Center, 2015: 21). On 
March 12, 1993 North Korea reaction to 
the IAEA's request for a special 
inspection, announced its decision to 
withdraw from the NPT under Article X. 
In Article X Paragraph 1 of NPT stated 
that: 
 
“Each Party shall exercise its national 
sovereignty has the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the 
supreme interests of its country. It must 
be noticed to all other United Nations 
Security Councils three months in 
advance. Such notice should include a 
statement of the extraordinary event as 
 
having jeopardized its supreme 
interests.”(NPT 1968: Art. X). 
 
Under the provision of the treaty, the 
withdrawal from a state does not take 
effect until 90 days after it has given 
notice. On 11 June 1993, one day before 
North Korea notice of withdrawal from 
the NPT was to have come into effect, 
DPRK stated in the Joint Statement with 
the USA that it had “decided unilaterally 
to suspend as long as it was deemed 
necessary to withdraw from the Nuclear 
 
Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty 
effectively.” North Korea also accepts 
IAEA regular inspection on the sites that 
North Korea had declared in its Initial 
Report (IAEA Report, 2011: 3). 
 
In the case of North Korea In 1993, 
North Korea announced its withdrawal 
from the NPT after IAEA request for 
 
 
 
special inspection on several nuclear sites 
rejected by North Korea. The withdrawal 
was within Article X Paragraph 1 of NPT, 
where an extraordinary event has 
jeopardized the supreme interest of North 
Korea. An extraordinary event happened 
because of the request by IAEA to inspect 
several nuclear sites that could threaten its 
sovereignty as an independent state. 
 
C. Crisis in 1994 and the Agreed 
 
Framework 
 
In 1994, the IAEA suggested that 
when the irradiated fuel from the 5MW(e) 
reactor will be discharged, it should be 
discharged in a way that IAEA permit so 
they could verify the history of the reactor 
core activity. It will also help to solve the 
question of whether North Korea had 
separated more plutonium than what they 
had declared in its Initial Report or not. 
 
In May 1994, North Korea rejected 
 
IAEA’s proposal and carelessly 
discharged the fuel in a way that is not 
approved by IAEA as to make any 
historical analysis of the core will be 
impossible to track (Dembinski, 1995: 
35). On 10 June 1994, IAEA Board of 
Governors decided to suspend all IAEA 
technical assistance in North Korea. North 
Korea responded on 13 June by 
announcing its withdrawal from the 
Agency. On 16 June 1994, the United 
States proposed that the Security Council 
should impose a series of more severe 
sanctions on North Korea. The action of 
the United States was responded by North 
Korea saying that sanctions would mean 
war. The USA declared that threats would 
not discourage it. This event causes a 
 
 
LPPM STIH Putri Maharaja Payakumbuh - 39 
Yordan Gunawan dan Rima Ayu Andriana: The Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons In... 
 
 
crisis as a war might break out between 
the United States and North Korea. 
 
After the tension culminated, on 17 
June 1994 the former President Jimmy 
Carter stepped in and went to Pyongyang 
to discuss the crisis with Kim Il Sung 
himself and Carter managed to come back 
with a conciliatory message (Litwak & 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2017). If the USA was prepared 
to meet North Korea on certain points 
(e.g., diplomatic recognition, an assurance 
that the USA would not attack North 
Korea and access to US nuclear power 
technology), North Korea would be 
prepared to refrain from refueling the 
operating reactor and to refrain from 
reprocessing the spent fuel, perhaps stop 
the construction of the larger reactors, and 
allow the IAEA to keep its inspectors in 
the North Korea. 
 
The US barely responded to this 
suggestion by continuing high-level 
discussions with the Government of the 
DPRK despite the death of Kim Il-Sung 
and the allegedly unresolved power 
struggle in Pyongyang. On 5 August 
1994, ‘high-level talks’ reopened in 
Geneva and on 18 October the two 
delegations announced that they had been 
able to conclude in a so-called “Agreed 
Framework,” which they signed three 
days later on 21 October 1994. On 4 
November 1994, the Security Council 
asked the IAEA to carry out the tasks 
assigned to it in the “Agreed Framework” 
and on 11 November 1994, the IAEA 
Board authorized the Director-General to 
do so. Under the Agreed Framework: 
 
 
a. North Korea would freeze its existing 
 
nuclear program and accept 
international verification of all 
existing plants; 
 
b. The IAEA would verify compliance 
with the freeze and would continue to 
inspect unfrozen activities; 
 
c. North Korea would eventually 
dismantle all the frozen plants; 
 
d. The two governments would seek 
methods of storing the fuel from the 5 
MW(e) reactor and disposing of it in a 
way that does not involve 
reprocessing in the North Korea; 
 
e. The USA would put together an 
international agreement to arrange 
financing the supply of two 1000 
MW(e) light water reactors; 
 
f. Dismantling of the North Korea’s 
plants would be completed when the 
LWR project is completed; 
 
g. The USA would arrange for the 
supply of heavy oil to offset the 
energy foregone due to the freeze of 
the North Korea graphite-moderated 
reactors; 
 
h. Both nations would loosen the trade 
restrictions and move toward 
establishing diplomatic relations; 
 
i. The USA would give formal 
assurances to North Korea against the 
threat of use of nuclear weapons by 
the USA; 
 
j. Steps will be taken by North Korea to 
implement the North-South Korean 
agreement on denuclearizing the 
peninsula; 
 
k. North Korea would remain party to 
the NPT and would allow 
implementation of its safeguards 
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agreement under the Treaty; 
significant portion of the light water 
reactor project was completed, but 
before delivery of key nuclear 
components, North Korea will come 
into full compliance with its 
safeguards agreement, including 
taking all steps that may be deemed 
necessary by the IAEA, following 
consultations with the Agency with 
regard to verifying the accuracy and 
completeness of the Initial Report on 
all nuclear material in the It should 
also be noted there was no mention in 
the Agreed Framework that North 
Korea rejoining the IAEA. 
 
After the conclusion of 1994 Agreed 
Framework, the United States together 
with South Korea and Japan agreed to 
establish the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO) in 
order to implement the 1994 Agreed 
Framework in March 1995. KEDO would 
supervise the financing and construction 
of light-water reactors to replace the 
 
existing North Korea’s graphite-
moderator reactors (Pollack, 2003: 10). 
North Korea and KEDO signed the 
contract for two LWRs in December 1995 
with completion target date of LWRs 
project on 2003. 
 
Based on the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, North Korea agreed to freeze 
their existing nuclear programs and accept 
inspection on ‘unfrozen’ plants and 
eventually dismantle their ‘frozen’ plants. 
Another highlight from the Agreed 
Framework is that North Korea would 
 
 
 
remain as a party to the NPT in exchange 
for Light-Water Reactor (LWR). 
 
LWR, commonly used reactors in 
nuclear power plants, were mentioned in 
the Agreed Framework. North Korea was 
demanding for the completion of LWR in 
exchange for the implementation of IAEA 
safeguard to be allowed. LWR is very 
needed by North Korea as they have been 
facing energy and electricity shortage for 
over a decade and resulted in the 
development of its economic constrained 
(Zhang, 2006: 3.). 
 
Two main primary resources relied 
on by North Korea in the early 2000s is 
coal and hydropower. Coal resource in 
North Korea is minimal and recoverable 
reserved coal used as a fuel in coal-fired 
power generation only supply generator 
for about ten years. However, the coal 
generator has decreased that was caused 
by flood and hydropower is also damaged 
by the flood. North Korea realized as they 
are gradually losing its primary energy, 
they need to ensure security energy in the 
future by exploring and developing 
nuclear power plants based on another 
energy resource, which is uranium. 
 
North Korea has plenty of natural 
uranium which could be used as a fuel to 
supply its electricity generator for 
hundreds of years (Zhang, 2006: 3). They 
reported having known natural uranium 
around 300,000 Megaton which estimated 
could supply nuclear power generator for 
around 250 years if they manage to 
process the natural uranium so that it can 
be used. That is why LWR is very 
 
 
 
 
LPPM STIH Putri Maharaja Payakumbuh - 41 
Yordan Gunawan dan Rima Ayu Andriana: The Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons In... 
 
 
important for North Korea to acquire in 
order to process natural uranium. 
 
The discovery of the U.S intelligence 
on North Korea attempt in acquiring 
materials and equipment for the 
construction of their enrich facility in 
early of 2000s violated the value of 1994 
Agreed Framework which both states, the 
United States and North Korea, pledge to 
keep the Korean Peninsula free from 
nuclear weapons and to normalize both of 
their political and economic relations. 
This violation resulted in the breakdown 
of the Agreed Framework. 
 
North Korea is a non-nuclear-weapon 
state (NNWS) which based on NPT, 
NNWS nuclear activities shall only serve 
to peaceful purposes and shall be verified 
by the IAEA Safeguards system. Not only 
in NPT, based on 1992 Joint Declaration 
between North Korea and South Korea 
where North Korea agreed that their 
nuclear activities will only for peaceful 
purposes and requires them not to possess 
any facilities for nuclear reprocessing and 
uranium enrichment which could lead to 
manufacturing of nuclear weapons. 
 
North Korea has been found trying to 
build an enrichment facility to enrich their 
uranium while it is still a part of NPT as 
an NNWS and is under obligation 
conferred by NPT. An NNWS has the 
right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
for the benefit in doing research, 
production and uses the nuclear energy 
which is a right that is unable to be taken 
away from States parties to NPT and 
protected under Article IV of NPT. 
However, the right has to be in full 
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conformity with their non-proliferation 
obligation as a non-nuclear-weapon 
States. Accepting IAEA safeguards 
system is an obligation that every NNWS 
must comply based on Article III of NPT 
in order to prevent any diversion from 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy to 
manufacturing or to acquire nuclear 
weapons or any nuclear explosive devices. 
By the discovery that North Korea were 
trying to use the nuclear energy to be 
nuclear weapon, they were not in good 
faith with the NPT and the Agreed 
Framework. It is proven that North Korea 
being non-compliance with its obligation 
contain in NPT. 
 
In summer 2002, U.S. intelligence 
report that they discovered evidence of 
Highly Enrichment Uranium (HEU) 
technology or materials transfers from 
Pakistan to North Korea in exchange for 
ballistic missile technology. It was 
discovered that there were black-market 
nuclear activities of Pakistani nuclear 
scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who 
confronted North Korea the alternative 
way to acquire nuclear weapons. He 
deliberately proliferated nuclear weapons 
technology for the profit where he 
transferred centrifuges, oils, and the 
instruction on centrifuge technology 
(Nikitin, 2013: 9). The centrifuge was 
materials that are going to be used for the 
construction of the gas-centrifuge 
enrichment facility by North Korea. 
Around that time, North Korea started to 
build the secret facility of uranium 
enrichment at Kangson which located in 
the outskirts of Pyongyang. 
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After the confrontation made by the 
United States to the DPRK’s secret 
uranium enrichment facility, the Bush 
Administration called upon the North 
Korea to stop their secret uranium 
enrichment facility and put pressure to the 
North Korea by passing a Resolution 
through KEDO that contain the 
suspension on heavy oil shipment and 
suspension of light water reactors 
construction in 2002. North Korea reacted 
to the pressure by taking a hostile move 
which is to restart its nuclear program that 
was shut down under the Agreed 
Framework in 1994. IAEA officials were 
also expelled from DPRK who had been 
keeping under surveillance the plutonium 
facilities (Niksch, 2005: 3). 
 
The dispute culminated on January 
2003 when North Korea announced its 
withdrawal from the NPT. North Korea 
announced instant effectuation on their 
withdrawal from the NPT and they 
threatened to end their moratorium on 
long-range missile test applied since 
1999. After the withdrawal, North Korea 
also declared that they are free from any 
restriction of the safeguard agreement 
with the IAEA. 
 
North Korea North Korea announced 
its withdrawal again from the NPT but 
with immediate effectuation of their 
withdrawal because North Korea argued 
that they had fulfilled the NPT’s three-
month notice. North Korea insists on their 
stance that because their 1993 withdrawal 
was suspended on days 89, one day before 
their withdrawal took in effect, so their 
withdrawal in 2003 will take in effect one 
 
 
 
day after the announcement as a form of 
continuation. North Korea procedure to 
withdraw from the NPT in 2003 did not 
fulfill the requirement contained in Article 
X Paragraph 1 of NPT. Therefore, the 
withdrawal could not be determined as 
legitimate. However, with the absence of 
any action by the United Nations Security 
Council upon North Korea withdrawal in 
2003, North Korea withdrawal considered 
justified. 
 
D. Six-Party Talks as a Diplomatic 
 
Measures 
 
The first round of Six-Party Talks 
began in August 2003 which involving 
several states such as Japan, People’s 
Republic of China, the Russian 
Federation, the United States, the 
Republic of Korea, and the DPRK itself. 
These talks aimed to find a peaceful 
resolution regarding security in the 
Korean peninsula region because of the 
nuclear weapons program in North Korea. 
The first round of Six-Party Talks took 
place in Beijing on August 27, 2003 
where North Korea demands a 
normalization of relations with the United 
States. At the end of the talks, parties 
involved agreed to commit to resolving 
nuclear issue by peaceful means and 
dialogue, taking the security concern of 
DPRK into consideration, and stay away 
from any action that could aggravate the 
situation in the process of negotiations 
(“Six-Point Consensus Reached at Six-
party Talks: Chinese Vice FM,”). 
 
The second round of talks was held 
on February 2004 in Beijing. The second 
round was focused on how to resolve the 
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nuclear issue and how North Korea 
should denuclearize. The Chairman’s 
Statement, the Six-Party Talks written 
document, was issued in which the parties 
agreed to resolve the nuclear issues 
through dialogue peacefully, wished for 
coexistence between participating parties, 
and emphasizing on the of mutually 
coordinated measures 
 
The talks continue to the third round 
on June 23 to 26 in the same year the 
second round was held. In the third round 
of the Talks, North Korea stated that a 
‘freeze’ on their nuclear program would 
be the last step of denuclearization; whiles 
the U.S. proposed that denuclearization 
need to be done periodically. The United 
States proposes that North Korea will be 
given three months to prepare freezing on 
its nuclear program and to submit a report 
North Korea full activities in their nuclear 
program. A sufficient consensus did not 
reach for a Joint Statement in this round, 
but the commitment was made to resolve 
the issue. 
 
The Talks from the third round to the 
fourth round had it breaks for a year. The 
breaks caused by the Presidential Election 
in the U.S. and North Korea wanted to 
wait for the confirmation of Bush second 
administration before they decided to 
attend the talks. However, in early 
February 2005, North Korea announced 
that they possessed nuclear weapons and 
would not attend any six-party talks. They 
accused the United States wanted to 
overthrow North Korea government. In 
July 2005, after a meeting with the U.S. 
lead negotiator, Christopher Hill, North 
 
 
Korea announced that they would attend 
another round of Six-Party Talks. One of 
the reasons why North Korea was willing 
to be back on Six-Party Talks was because 
of United States stated that they recognize 
North Korea as a sovereign state and the 
United States do not have any intention to 
invade North Korea. 
 
After some coordination, the fourth 
round of Six-Party Talks was held in 
Beijing and was divided into two phases, 
26 July to 7 August and 13 September to 
19 September. The process was very long 
but it produced a very successful result. A 
Joint Statement was finally made between 
the parties. The highlight of the Joint 
Statement was North Korea pledged itself 
to abandon their nuclear programs and all 
its nuclear weapon, return to the NPT and 
would receive IAEA inspection, and their 
right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to 
be respected by other parties. 
Unfortunately, the positive result from the 
previous round did not last long. Once 
more, North Korea banned the Six-Party 
Talks after the U.S. imposed economic 
sanctions to them following the accusation 
made by the U.S. that Banco Delta Asia 
(BDA), a Macau-based bank, had money 
laundering bank notes from some of the 
North Korean accounts (M. 
 
B. D. Nikitin, Chanlett-Avery, & Manyin, 
2017: 8). 
 
Following the sanction imposed by 
the United States, North Korea conducted 
its very first nuclear missile test in 2006 
which received many condemn from 
another state. UN Security Council passed 
its 1718 Resolution that prohibits North 
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Korea from conducting future nuclear 
tests or launch a ballistic missile and calls 
them to stop any of their activity in 
developing nuclear weapons. The 
Resolution banned exports and imports in 
for of any military weapons and 
equipment, and UNSC freezes the asset of 
North Korea and a travel ban on people 
and entities tied to the nuclear program. 
 
Another round of talks resumed in 
February 2007 in which an agreement was 
made to execute the Joint Statement. In 
the agreement, North Korea pledged to 
shut down their nuclear facilities and to 
declare every activity related to nuclear, 
and in exchange for that, North Korea will 
be provided tons of heavy fuel oil and 
removed from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism. The other parties have 
committed themselves to help North 
Korea by providing energy assistance. 
IAEA officers will also be returned to 
North Korea to inspect and monitor the 
facilities at Yongbyon which their 
presence was there until mid-April 2009. 
 
In the sixth round, it was confirmed 
by IAEA officials that the nuclear reactor 
in Yongbyon had been shut and sealed in 
July 2007 and the United States 
announced that North Korea had been 
removed from the list of the state which 
sponsors terrorism. On 5 April 2009, 
North Korea launched its first satellite 
which was condemned by the UN 
Security Council and the action was 
considered to violate UNSC Resolution 
1718. The UN Security Council agreed to 
expand the sanctions on North Korea 
which responded by North Korea that the 
 
 
 
Joint Statement and the Talks would no 
longer bound them. 
 
After the conduct of nuclear missile 
test in 2006 and 2009, North Korea had 
conducted another nuclear test and 
satellite launch. The UN Security Council 
had issued several Resolutions to North 
Korea: 
 
1. The second Resolution issued in 
2009, where they imposed further 
sanctions on North Korea was 
included in Resolution 1874 in 
response to the second nuclear test, 
conducted in May 2009. The 
Resolution imposes a restriction to 
North Korea in developing nuclear 
weapons program and also tightens 
sanctions on nuclear weapons 
development programs and tightens 
sanctions on further goods, such as 
 
all imports and exports of weapons, 
and also to additional persons and 
entities that have a relation with the 
 
nuclear program. Financial 
transaction, transfer or loan that could 
be used to help the development of 
nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles 
is also prohibited. States are required 
to do an inspection and detain any 
cargo coming to or from North Korea 
through their territory on land, sea, or 
air if the cargo is suspected of being 
used to develop nuclear. 
 
2. In December 2012, North Korea 
successfully launched its satellite 
which received condemnation from 
many countries. On January 2013, 
the UN Security Council passed 2087 
Resolution by strengthening the 
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previous sanctions and calling for 
states again to do inspection on North 
Korean cargo passing through their 
territory. 
 
3. Resolution 2094 was issued after 
another nuclear test was conducted by 
North Korea continue in February 
2013 where UN Security Council 
adopted the Resolution condemns the 
test and strengthen existing sanctions 
given to the North Korea. Another 
target of the Resolution is denying 
big amount of cash transfer into 
North Korea and calling for sanction 
to any bank account that related to the 
North Korea nuclear program. 
 
4. Resolution 2270 was passed in 2016 
after North Korea nuclear and missile 
test which include inspection of all 
cargo passing to and from North 
Korea and prohibition of all trade on 
nuclear weapons. Additional to that, 
restriction on North Korean imports 
of luxury goods. 
 
5. In response to North Korea missile 
test on July 2017, Resolution 2375 
was adopted by UN Security Council. 
The Resolution imposed oil sanctions 
against the North Korea by reducing 
level of oil barrel exports from 4 
million barrels to 2 million barrels 
per year. It also applied to exports of 
refined petroleum products. The 
Resolution bans the North Korean 
textile also restrict the country’s 
workers export. 
 
In North Korea’s case, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
illegitimate as their status under the NPT 
 
 
is still a member and their obligation not 
to acquire or manufacture nuclear 
weapons. As in the result on the fourth 
round of Six-Party Talks, North Korea 
agreed to return to the NPT and must 
comply with its entire obligation. North 
Korea is not directly withdraw from the 
NPT because of the decision made is not a 
multilateral decision while the Talks itself 
is a multilateral agreement. There was 
never any official withdrawal made by 
North Korea after returning the NPT 
where a withdrawal from the treaty must 
be recognized by other States. Therefore, 
North Korea is still part of NPT and still 
bound by the obligation contain in NPT. 
In conclusion, North Korea is not allowed 
to develop any nuclear technology, expose 
all of the nuclear facility, and eventually 
undertake a complete nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the fact that North Korea has 
declared the withdrawal from the NPT in 
2003, North Korea is still a member of the 
treaty. As in Article X of NPT stated that 
a withdrawal from the treaty must be 
notified to other members and the United 
Nations Security Council, which never did 
by North Korea. Therefore, North Korea 
has the same rights and obligations with 
other members of the NPT and to 
 
make progress on disarmament 
obligations by ceasing activity in 
developing nuclear weapons and complete 
nuclear disarmament. 
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